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Procedural Injustice: How the Practices
and Procedures Of The Child Welfare System
Disempower Parents And Why It Matters
by Vivek Sankaran and Itzhak Lander Ph.D

Introduction
Many of us appear surprised when families involved in the child protective system do not reunify.
A parent’s path to reuniﬁcation seems straightforward.
Upon a ﬁnding of neglect, the court prescribes a basic
regimen, typically consisting of parenting classes,
counseling, drug testing, and a psychological evaluation, that a parent must fulﬁll prior to having the
child returned to his/her custody. If a parent successfully completes these seemingly minimal requirements, the law requires reuniﬁcation unless the return
poses a “substantial risk of harm” to the child.1 With
such high stakes involved, a clearly deﬁned path for
success, and the prospect of termination of parental
rights looming over them, parents have every incentive
to complete these requirements quickly and succeed
in the overwhelming majority of cases. One would
expect parents, ﬁghting zealously for their children, to
diligently complete court-mandated requirements and
promptly reunify with their children. This is the child
protective system we strive to achieve. This goal is embodied in the Michigan Juvenile Code, which states
a preference that a child coming within the court’s
jurisdiction “receives the care, guidance, and control,
preferably in his or her own home.”2
Yet, today, we ﬁnd ourselves far removed from this
aspiration. Nationally, only 54% of children exiting foster care are returned to their parents’ custody.3
Local statistics paint an even darker picture of reality. Over 60 percent of children removed by the
Michigan Department of Human Services (“DHS”
or “Department”) do not return home within a year.4
For families under the supervision of a private child
welfare agency, that number rises to approximately
70 percent.5 Nearly half of all families never reunify.6
And, as has been highly publicized, over 6,000

children remain in the Michigan foster care system
as permanent court wards whose parents’ rights have
been terminated but who still await adoptive homes.7
These statistics present a system that has failed in
facilitating the prompt reuniﬁcation of children with
their parents. Somewhere soon after the child protective case is initiated, many parents become disengaged
in the process, fail to complete services, and drop out
of their child’s life.
Why has this systemic failure occurred? Certainly
the complex myriad of problems confronting parents
such as drug use, mental illness, and domestic violence
often creates insurmountable barriers that may take
years to overcome. In a very small number of cases,
the seriousness of the abuse or neglect warrant a wise
decision by the DHS and the court to immediately
terminate the legal relationship between the parent
and the child.8 In others, the Department fails to
provide quality services to parents in a timely manner.
In many cases, parents are willing and able to reunify
with their children with the provision of services
which may be available, yet they ultimately fail. This
failure occurs, in part, due to the ways in which the
procedures used by the child protective system disconnect and alienate parents from the decision making process involving their children. This process of
disempowerment occurs immediately upon the ﬁling
of a child protective petition, a time during which
allegations of abuse or neglect have not been proven,
and continues until parental rights are terminated.
At every possible opportunity, the system impresses
upon parents, most of whom come from traditionally
disenfranchised populations,9 that they are no longer
capable of raising their children, and does this by
silencing their voices both in and out of court and giving them little control over the process. The emascula-
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tion is complete when parents completely disengage
with the system which permits judges to terminate
their rights and consider other “permanency” options
for children. To the extent that the child protective
system is serious about reunifying children with their
parents, many of its practices and procedures undermine that objective. This dissonance, which has
signiﬁcant repercussions for child welfare policy, will
be explored.

Procedural Justice
The “straightforward” picture of the system painted
at the outset of this article masks the complex relationships in a child protective case between the parent, the
Department, and the court. The challenges confronting child welfare professionals are profound. Typically,
a parent becomes enmeshed in the court system after
the Department either has removed or seeks to remove
children from his/her custody.10 At this juncture,
parents are angry, frustrated, and frightened about the
prospects of losing their children to a system in which
strangers will raise them. They lack any conﬁdence
in the Department and the court that has just authorized the removal and are confused about what will
happen next. Often, these parents appear hostile and
confrontational as they have been stripped of the most
important piece of their lives—their children. Few of
us would behave any diﬀerently.
The challenge facing the child welfare system lies
in motivating parents, completely disillusioned with
the process, to accept and comply with a series of
mandates issued by a department and court that the
parent has already deemed to be antagonistic due to
the sudden, traumatic removal. Upon removal, the
parent often loses conﬁdence in the decision making
process, and procedures to re-establish its legitimacy
from the parent’s perspective must be implemented to
bolster the chances for reuniﬁcation. The task of establishing a system to achieve these goals is daunting yet
attainable. Research in the ﬁeld of social psychology,
described generally as “procedural justice,” instructs
us on how exactly we might promote this delicate
balance of engendering trust in a seemingly hostile
relationship between the parent and governmental
authorities.
Repeated studies by social psychologists provide compelling evidence that a key determinant in
retaining the support of those receiving unfavorable
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outcomes is the utilization of fair procedures to make
decisions.11 Surprisingly, although an individual’s willingness to accept authorities’ decisions is shaped by
the favorability of outcomes, research shows that outcome favorability is not the only, or even major, factor
shaping acceptance and satisfaction.12 Both trust in
the motives of authorities and judgments about the
fairness of procedures they use are stronger inﬂuences on acceptance and satisfaction than achieving a
particular outcome in a case.13 These ﬁndings provide
hope that courts and agencies can achieve voluntary
compliance with orders and recommendations even
when taking actions in the short term that may run
contrary to the parents’ interests.
In assessing what is “fair,” litigants look to a
number of factors. Most importantly, procedures that
permit individuals to present arguments and to exert
control over the process are deemed just, whereas
those that silence litigants only exacerbate feelings of
mistrust.14 Central to these ﬁndings is a person’s need
to have his story told, regardless of whether the telling will ultimately impact the outcome of the case.15
Fairness is also enhanced by adequate representation
and conﬁdence that the decision-maker is neutral and
unbiased.16 Courts that reaﬃrm one’s self-respect and
treat people politely while respecting their rights earn
the trust of those before it, regardless of the substance
of the orders it issues.17
Why is the satisfaction of litigants important?
Research demonstrates that greater satisfaction with
the process signiﬁcantly increases the likelihood that
litigants will comply with the mandates of authorities,
even when those authorities are taking actions which
may be detrimental to the interests of those individuals.18 This result is particularly salient in child protective cases in which a ﬁnding of neglect only represents
the beginning of the case and the ultimate outcome
depends largely on the willingness of the parent to
obey the dictates of others.19 Parents must comply
with case service plans and court orders to eﬀectuate
the child’s return home. Satisfaction with the process
helps child welfare authorities achieve voluntary compliance with treatment requirements.
Designing a child protective system based on
principles of procedural justice would invest more
parents in the process and enhance the legitimacy of
the various decision makers ranging from judges to
social workers.
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What would be the key elements of such a system? Parents would be represented zealously by able,
adequately-compensated counsel, who would present
their stories to the court. The court, which would
treat parents with the utmost of respect, would give
them the opportunity to present evidence regarding all
aspects of the case, including their story of what happened and what they need to reunify with their children. Judges, mindful of the power imbalance between
parents and the Department,20 would carefully and
patiently listen to each party’s story and meticulously
follow court procedures and evidentiary rules prior to
making just determinations regarding the family.
Outside of court, caseworkers would meet regularly with parents and consider their input prior to
developing and updating case service plans aimed at
assessing the family’s strengths and needs, and prescribing services to address any deﬁcits. Lawyer-guardians ad litem would work to understand the parent’s
perspective, prior to rendering an opinion on what is
best for the child, by regularly meeting with the parent and other members of the extended family. And,
of course, parents would have regular access to their
attorneys, who would advocate on behalf of the parent
and serve as the conduit of the parent’s perspective.
In all aspects of the child protective case, the parent’s
voice would be heard, and his/her opinion would be
respected. A child protective system based on principles of procedural justice would not require rendering
outcomes based solely on the parent’s wishes. It would
simply empower parents and validate their experiences
by giving them a voice and input in the process.

Procedural Injustice
Today’s child protective service, however, lacks attributes reﬂecting procedural justice values for parents.
Although laws exist aﬀording parents procedural
protections and rights, in practice, these guarantees
have been vitiated, leaving parents with few, if any, opportunities to participate meaningfully in the development of their case. Statutory and constitutional rights
to parents’ counsel have been eviscerated by delayed
appointments, low pay, and high caseloads. Relaxed
advocacy and procedural shortcuts have been justiﬁed by eﬃciency considerations and by furthering the
amorphous “best interests of the child.”21 Receiving
parental input on important decisions has been replaced with decision making based on the opinions of

z

third-party professionals, many of whom lack meaningful relationships with the family. Each of these
factors, among others, contributes to a system that
disempowers parents, increases their dissatisfaction
with the process, and reduces the likelihood that they
will complete services and reunify with their children.
Some are highlighted below.
Right To Counsel

Attorneys are their clients’ voice in the courtroom.
They play a crucial role in conveying their clients’
perspective to the court, zealously advocating for that
position in all proceedings, and protecting the sacrosanct constitutional rights at stake. As observed in
Reist v. Bay County Circuit Judge:
Parents most often involved in neglect and
termination proceedings are usually the least
equipped, in terms of intellectual and emotional
resources, to respond to such proceedings. The
indigent are frequently the least able to cope
with government in its oﬃcial functions. The
case at bar was routine for the welfare workers
and other juvenile court staﬀ. For the indigent
mother, however, the entire proceedings were
incomprehensible.22
As such, in Michigan, a parent has an unqualiﬁed right to counsel, which is recognized in statute,
court rules, and case law. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 712A.17c (West 2002) explicitly provides a parent
with “the right to an attorney at each stage of the proceeding” and “the right to a court-appointed attorney
if the respondent is ﬁnancially unable to employ an
attorney.”23 Not only does such a right exist, but attorneys representing parents must be eﬀective, competent, and diligent.24 The full panoply of responsibilities mandated by the Michigan Rules of Professional
Conduct applies to parents’ attorneys, who are subject
to disciplinary actions if they deviate from the rules.
In practice, however, a parent’s right to eﬀective
counsel has yet to be fully recognized. Whether a
parent receives court-appointed counsel at the outset
of the child protective case varies across the state.
Custodial parents are only represented by attorneys
in approximately 60 percent of removal hearings and
50 percent of non-removal hearings.25 For non-custodial parents, that number drops to 30 and 20 percent
respectively.26 “If the parent . . . is not represented at
all at the preliminary hearing, decisions to remove
13
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the child can appear arbitrary, and parents may feel
that they do not know how to speak to the jurist to
explain their situations.”27 In certain counties, such
as Genesee County, as a matter of practice, no parent
receives the assistance of court-appointed counsel at
the preliminary hearing. These jurisdictions typically
appoint attorneys weeks after the preliminary hearing
after critical decisions in the case have already been
made, including the child’s removal from the home
and placement into care.28 In contrast, statistics reveal
that children are appointed lawyer-guardians ad litem
to represent their “best interests” in over 90 percent of
cases in which removal is requested.29
Appointment of counsel by itself, however, does
not necessarily lead to eﬀective representation because
of extremely low rates of compensation. No statewide
standards exist establishing a baseline compensation
for parent’s attorneys, and thus, practice varies among
counties.30 While some counties pay attorneys an
hourly rate, many, including the counties which have
the largest foster care populations in the state, including Wayne County, Oakland County, and Genesee
County, compensate parents’ attorneys by hearing or
stage of the case. For example, in Genesee County,
attorneys are paid $300 if their clients enter a plea, approximately $450 if the case goes to trial, and $50 per
review hearing. In Oakland County, lawyers receive
$300 for a plea, $450 for a trial, and $120 for review
hearings. Similar payment structures are utilized in a
number of the larger counties.31
The disincentives to zealous lawyering created by
this structure are transparent. Attorneys are encouraged to practice relaxed advocacy, do little work outside of the courtroom, and push their clients towards
entering into pleas. As described above, in Genesee
and Oakland Counties, an attorney only receives an
extra $150 to go to trial if his client does not enter
into a plea despite the substantial amount of preparation a trial entails including drafting examinations,
preparing witnesses, and subpoenaing documents. At
the review hearing stage, if an attorney spends one
hour a week on a parent’s case between hearings, a
conservative average, his hourly billing rate, based
on the $50 payment, would come out to under $4
per hour, well below the minimum wage. And, if a
parent’s attorney engages in creative lawyering and
gets the Department to dismiss a case prior to the
court’s assumption of jurisdiction, he runs a high risk
of not being paid for his eﬀorts. Under this system,
14

the only way a parent’s attorney can make a living is
to maintain high caseloads and limit the extent of his
advocacy for any one client.
Not surprisingly, this skewed system has aﬀected
the quality of legal assistance parents receive. Attorneys maintain caseloads in the hundreds, and in some
courthouses, substitution of counsel is routine due to
scheduling conﬂicts.32 As one person observed:
[P]arents’ attorneys in Wayne County meet in
the cafeteria and ‘deal the morning’s cases like
cards,’ trading cases back and forth based on
who is going to be in which courtroom that day.
Attorneys who work on these cases in Wayne
County generally are not able to do other kinds
of work and must maintain high caseload numbers to assure themselves adequate income. If a
parent’s attorney is not available at the time of
the hearing, the parent is oﬀered house counsel—an attorney who is on call for that day and
who is assigned to come in to the hearing without ever having seen the case ﬁle or ever having
met the parent.33
Client contact also appears to be infrequent. Onethird of judges responding to a statewide survey report
that parents’ attorneys rarely speak to their clients before hearings.34 Attorneys themselves report that often
they cannot meet their clients in their oﬃces and must
talk to them in the lobby or outside of the courthouse
just before the hearing.35 Without frequent contact
with their clients, it is diﬃcult to comprehend how
any meaningful advocacy can occur.
Statistics reveal that relaxed advocacy has become
the norm in the system. Decisions to remove a child
from the home are rarely challenged, and the overwhelming majority of child protective cases resolve in
pleas. 36 Michigan is one of three states in the country
that provide parents with the right to a jury trial at
the jurisdiction stage, yet in 2005, jury verdicts were
rendered in fewer than 1 percent of cases. 37 In contrast, parents pled to allegations against them in nearly
4,000 cases.38 Similarly, despite clear statutory provisions mandating that the court inquire in each case as
to whether the Department made “reasonable eﬀorts”
to prevent the removal of children from their home
and to ﬁnalize the child’s permanent placement, these
ﬁndings are rarely challenged by parents’ attorneys.39
Over 90 percent of judges have rarely or never found
that the Department failed to make reasonable eﬀorts
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despite signiﬁcant evidence about the availability of
appropriate services for parents in the system.40 Procedural protections provided to parents under State law
are not being exercised because the right to counsel
has not been fully enforced.
Not surprisingly, parents themselves provide the
most blistering critique of their representation. Parents
report that their attorneys do not return phone calls
or provide them with contact information.41 Attorneys fail to explain what is happening in their cases,
and do not give parents a chance to tell their story
at court hearings and make deals without consulting
them.42 Parents also conﬁrmed that often, their only
contact with their attorneys, if any, occurs for a few
minutes before hearings.43 Consequently, they are left
confused about what is happening.44 As summarized
in the 2005 Court Improvement Project Reassessment
Report, “What was reported to evaluators in this reassessment and what was observed in court hearings fall
disturbingly short of standards of practice.”45
The right to counsel plays a crucial role in enforcing standards of procedural justice in any court process.
Yet, in child protective proceedings, the system has left
this right hollow for parents accused of maltreatment.
Although many practitioners who work in this ﬁeld are
passionate and talented, the conditions in which they
must practice prevent them from engaging in the level
of advocacy that is needed to empower parents and give
them a sense of control over the process. The system’s
refusal to embrace the importance of legal advocacy on
behalf of parents only contributes to the resentment,
frustration, and hostility that parents inevitably feel
towards those making important decisions.
Other Forms Of Disempowerment

The failure to fully recognize the parent’s right
to counsel is only one manifestation of the many ways
in which the child protective system denies parents
their dignity and silences their voices. Upon the initiation of a case, parents may fail to receive notice of the
preliminary hearing. When they arrive at court, they
wait for hours in a crowded waiting room prior to
their case being called.46 Often, seats are a premium,
and no space exists for parents to speak privately with
their attorneys or case workers.47 The following typiﬁes the experience of many:
Evaluators observed that the lobby waiting area
became crowded with many people having to
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stand up because there were so few seats. In
this area, there was chaos, noise, and a lack of
privacy. Names were called over a loudspeaker
which was heard throughout the waiting area so
everyone present learned the names of the other
persons before the court. Attorneys generally
had to talk to clients in the lobby or outdoors.
Because of the lack of meeting rooms, attorneys
spoke openly about private family matters in
the waiting area in the presence of strangers.
Sometimes a person came to the waiting area
and said in front of others something like “your
drug test came back OK.”48
Once the hearing begins, the parent may or may not
be represented by counsel,49 and the process is short
and perfunctory. The Department’s version of the facts
is generally accepted,50 and more time may be spent
during the hearing trying to make the appropriate
“reasonable eﬀorts” and “contrary to the welfare” ﬁndings necessary to preserve eligibility for federal funding than on pressing issues like placement, visitation,
and the immediate provision of services for the family.
A lawyer-guardian ad litem, who, in all likelihood, has
had little opportunity to conduct any investigation
of the matter or to meet with the child, is oﬀered a
chance to present what is “best” for the child, but few
opportunities exist during the hearing for the parent to voice his/her concerns about what is happening. A clear message is sent through this process: The
opinions and wishes of the parent are not important
or relevant to the decisions being made by the court
about the child.
As the case continues, the parent is further stripped
of control over the process. State law requires the Department to prepare an initial service plan within 30
days after a child’s removal from the home.51 Department policy requires the engagement of the parent in
the drafting of the plan, which means an open conversation between the parent and social worker to discuss
needs and strengths and to reach an understanding
of what is entailed in meeting the goals of the service
plan.52 The Department itself notes that “[p]arental
engagement is an invaluable tool for achieving early
return home of children from foster care.”53
Unfortunately, the development of the case service
plan is another area in which parental involvement
has been stiﬂed. A 2005 report issued by the Foster
Care Review Board found that in a majority of cases
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reviewed, the plan was unsigned by parents and the
vast majority of parents felt that they had little input
and that the elements of the plan were essentially
decided by the case worker.54 These conclusions have
been corroborated by other sources. The Federal Child
and Family Services Review (CFSR) found that in 30
percent of cases reviewed, diligent eﬀorts were not
made to involve parents in the case planning process.55 Similarly, a statewide assessment discovered that
parents were not involved in approximately 40 percent
of treatment plans.56 The CFSR also concluded that
the DHS, in part due to the lack of parental involvement, failed to eﬀectively address the service needs of
families in 27 percent of the cases investigated.57
The systematic practice of shutting parents out
of decision making extends beyond the development
of the service plan. Both state and federal law mandate parental involvement, and often consent, before
making educational and medical decisions regarding
their children, even when the child is in the foster care
system. The Individual with Disabilities and Education Act (IDEA) preserves a parent’s authority to
make educational decisions until the child is a “ward
of the State,” at which point a surrogate parent may
be appointed.58 State law requires the parent’s consent
before any non-routine, elective, or surgical treatment
of the child.59 DHS policy mandates parental permission before a child can enroll in a private school or be
home schooled.60
Yet, experience and documented stories tells us
that parental involvement of this type is rarely seen in
today’s foster care system.61 Instead, once the case is
petitioned, child welfare professionals, with the best of
intentions, immerse themselves in the family’s background and independently determine what is best for
the child, excluding family members from the process.
Despite having a statutory mandate to “interview
family members,”62 lawyer-guardians ad litem rarely
consult with parents prior to making a “determination
regarding the child’s best interests.”63 Meetings are
held, decisions are made, and a child’s life is altered,
yet the opinions of those closest to the child are often
not considered. Rather than engaging in a cooperative process in which the parent provides substantial
input into identifying and addressing deﬁcits, in
practice, parents are simply told what they need to do
in a formulaic fashion without consideration of their
individual needs.
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A ﬁnal example of a way in which the system
erodes the decision making control of parents lies in
the court’s ability, under Michigan law, to assume
jurisdiction of a parent’s child without a ﬁnding of
parental unﬁtness against that parent. The law currently permits family courts to obtain jurisdiction or
temporary custody of a child based solely on a plea or
ﬁnding of unﬁtness against one parent.64 The Juvenile
Code, as interpreted by the case law, even allows a
court “to enter an order placing the children outside
of the custodial parent’s care whose neglect did not
factor into the assumption of jurisdiction over the
child.”65 Under this interpretation, a custodial parent who has done nothing to harm her child could be
deprived of total decision making authority over her
child based solely on ﬁndings made against a non-custodial parent who may have had minimal contact with
the child. This deprivation, even if contested, could
occur without an evidentiary hearing, which is not
required under the law after ﬁndings are made against
one parent.66 Afterwards, the extent of the custodial
parent’s ability to inﬂuence any of the educational,
medical, and placement decisions of the child would
be at the whim of the trial court judge. The case law
demonstrates numerous examples of parents being
shut out of the decision making process through
the application of this statutory regime.67 This is yet
another example of how the procedures used by our
child protection system alienate and disempower those
whom the system is trying to help.

Conclusion
The discussion above is not intended to paint a
comprehensive picture of the ways in which the procedures employed by the system undermine the goals of
family reuniﬁcation, but is meant to merely highlight
the problem. Much more work in the area is needed.
Recent initiatives, such as the Family to Family Program funded by the Casey Foundation are attempting
to reverse these longstanding practices. Among other
goals, the initiative seeks to involve birth parents in all
decisions to “ensure a network of support for children
and the adults who care for them.”68 As part of this
program, team decision making meetings, consisting
of parents, extended family, and community members,
along with child welfare professionals, are convened
prior to a change in a child’s placement. The “Parent
Partners” program, implemented in Wayne County,
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matches parents with others who have successfully
reuniﬁed with their children, to help show them that
they have control over the process. These programs
demonstrate great potential in restoring strength in
the family, yet they are early in their limited implementation, and their eﬀectiveness has yet to be evaluated fully. Regardless, the principles underlying the
program demonstrate the importance of recognizing
the role that parents, even after allegations of abuse are
made, should play in the rearing of their children.
Others measures, of which a comprehensive discussion is beyond the scope of this paper, must be taken
as well. In short, I recommend creating a statewide
task force, with leadership from the judiciary, legislature, and the Department of Human Services, to conduct a comprehensive assessment of how procedures
used in child protective cases silence the voices of
parents. Membership on the task force must include
parents’ attorneys and parents themselves. After conducting the assessment and widely disseminating the
results, the task force can discuss areas in need of improvement including strengthening a parent’s right to
counsel, making statutory changes to enhance parental
input in judicial and administrative decision making,
restructuring court facilities and processes to reinforce
a parent’s dignity and self-respect, and improving the
practice of attorneys and case workers to incorporate the views of parents and other family members.
Creating an institutional oﬃce to represent parents
and to provide support to parents’ attorneys similar
to the Center for Family Representation in New York
City69 or Community Legal Services in Philadelphia70
would be a logical ﬁrst step. Speciﬁc measures such as
establishing a reasonable, uniform rate for compensating parents’ attorneys and capping caseloads, creating
a statewide oﬃce to monitor the quality of representation parents receive, and establishing an administrative
case review process in which parents can participate,
are some of the other many possibilities for reform.
Although these measures themselves will not cure all
the problems that ail the child welfare system, they
will increase the likelihood that parents will engage
with the system and voluntarily accept decisions made
against them. Restoring the conﬁdence of parents in
the child welfare system will only increase positive
outcomes for children in care. 
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shall order the child returned to his or her parent.”)

2

Mich. Comp. Laws Ann § 712A.1(3) (West 2002).

3
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Statistics Better on Foster Care than Privates (May 24,
2007) (on ﬁle with author).

5

See id.

6

In 2003, only 54 percent of children who exited foster
care in Michigan were returned to their parents’ home.
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